mosque
in the village of Gollyadeil north of the town of Sittwe on 18 May
2012. (Reuters)
By
now the story has been told countless times in the wake of the recent
rioting in western Burma where tensions between the areas’
Rohingyas and Arakanese communities boiled over last month. People
were killed, houses destroyed, thousands were displaced and boatloads
of Rohingyas crossing into Bangladesh were turned away.
The
Rohingyas remain one of the most persecuted and vulnerable
communities in the world. The group has been repeatedly portrayed as
terrorists in both Bangladesh and Burma. The group cannot rightfully
claim Burma as their own state while Rohingya men are perceived to be
misogynist Muslims who threaten the ‘peace loving’ ethnically
heterogeneous, but predominantly Buddhist communities of Burma.
During
fieldwork on the Thai-Burma and Bangladesh-Burma border, I was deeply
troubled by the vitriol attitudes aimed at Rohingyas. I have
asked this question over and over again to activists and the
political elite, including 88-generation political activists from
Burma, why there was such profound tension and anxiety to include
Rohingyas in the otherwise inclusive activism that literally framed
Burma’s democratic movement.
The
international humanitarian discourse on refugees provides some
insights on how in the age of the ‘Global War on Terror’,
refugees are no longer welcome and are seen as security threats.
While citizens can be under surveillance and, at the same time
‘protected’ from outside threats, illegal immigrants, refugees,
stateless residents and internally displaced people remain as
threats, thus creating moral and ethical dilemmas for states.
Although
it is poor practice as a member of the international community and
detrimental for the global image to send away refugees, governments
often claim that it is imperative for state security and for the
protection of citizens. In this kind of security architecture,
borders are strictly controlled and identity differences are
accentuated and securitized.
Burma’s
fractured narrative
A
state that had gone through more than 60 years of conflict, during
which more than 30 insurgent, non-state armed groups have actively
fought against the Burmese government is bound to have multi-layered
internal divisions and security anxieties.
The
intense militarisation processes penetrated Burma’s everyday
discourses including its social, economic, cultural and political
systems, norms and priorities. The Tatmadaw’s strategies in
the guise of modernisation, articulated as ‘Burmanisation’, was
in effect a process of ‘homogenisation’ forcing out people whose
appearance, religious belief, language and everyday practices
reproduced their identity as the ‘other’ and, I would argue, the
enemy within.
By
deceptively producing the Muslims as the internal threat, the
military regime sought to portray itself as the protector of its
citizens. Ironically, while some of the other undemocratic and
authoritarian practices of the Tatmadaw have been challenged, the
regime had largely succeeded in wiping out the idea of including
Rohingyas in a multiethnic, heterogeneous national consciousness.
Through state-sponsored exclusion policies, Rohingyas were made
aliens in their own land.
“The
regime had largely succeeded in wiping out the idea of including
Rohingyas in a multiethnic, heterogeneous national consciousness”
Key
exclusion policies and strategies were implemented after the military
coup resulting in the restriction of free movement in 1962; the
promulgation of the Emergency Immigration Act designed to prevent
people entering from India, China and Bangladesh in 1974; the census
program, Nagamin, to check identification cards and take action
against illegal aliens in 1977; and the 1982 Citizenship Law
following the 1978 exodus when many Rohingyas returned or attempted
to return to Burma.
The
State Peace and Development Council repeatedly invoked its moral
authority through the lens of national security and state sovereignty
in dealing with Rohingyas. There is of course a historical
context to it, which could perhaps be explained through the ‘good’
citizens model. A key source of anxiety had been the perceived
disloyalty to the idea of a Burmese statehood by Rohingyas, such as
when the political elite sought to be an independent state and made
deals with the outgoing British Raj; when the community was divided
in its support of the local and national political shifts; and when
the armed resistance began.
Rohingyas
taking up arms have generated a different source of anxiety under the
pretext of the ‘war on terror’, unlike the other non-state armed
groups such as the Karen National Liberation Army, which has roughly
3,000 to 4,000 troops, or the Shan State Army-South, which has
between 6,000 and 7,000 troops.
The
divided system in various ethnic states such as in Karen state, Shan
state and Mon state in effect gives the control to the Tatmadaw and
those insurgency factions, which have entered into recent agreements
with the Burmese state. All these non-state armed actors claim
to be the champions of their groups’ rights and hold the view that
it is necessary to take up arms against Burma.
Similar
to these groups, the Rohingya militant movement also claims to be the
sole protector of the Muslim Arakanese/Rohingyas. Unlike the
other armed groups, the sharp reactions to their claims also come
from various democratic platforms of Burma.
One
of the leading groups, the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation
(ARNO) agreed to ban the use of anti-personnel mines and victim
activated explosive devices and signed the Geneva Call Deed of
Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on anti-personnel Mines and
for Cooperation in Mine Action (DoC) on 5 December 2003.
A
document that was leaked in early 2012 from 10 October 2002 claimed
the ARNO had links with various terrorist networks. The ARNO
was operating from Chittagong in Bangladesh and allegedly had
contacts with groups on the Thai-Burma border. The document noted
that the government of Bangladesh instructed the ARNO in May 2002 to
move its bases from southeastern Bangladesh, which resulted in 195
Arakan Army members turning themselves in to the Burmese.
Over
the last decade, the ARNO has significantly weakened in numbers and
leaned towards moderate politics unlike some of the other splinter
groups that attracted the more radical, extremist factions in the
country.
For
example, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation that broke away from
the Rohingya Patriotic Front in 1980s, and primarily operated across
the border in Bangladesh, attracted a number of radical and militant
Rohingya activists. RSO’s links with extremist groups in Bangladesh
and associations with the international terrorist networks have been
reported in media, which fuelled prejudice against all the Rohingyas.
According
to reports, the Bangladesh Army in a few major operations almost
disbanded the RSO as early as 2005. There are also a few small groups
such as the Central Rohingya Jammatul Ulama, the Ittehadul
Mujahiddial, the Rohingya Islamic Liberation Organisation and the
Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front. These groups joined the
Democratic Alliance of Burma in May 1992, which is virtually inactive
now.
The
Burmese and Bangladeshi authorities in reality take advantage of the
global climate of fear and anxiety that have securitised the
discourse concerning refugees, in particular Muslim refugees. This
‘refugees as threat’ perception matters when it comes to the
Rohingyas because the discourse actually drives policies and public
support of specific policies. Those who remained in camps in
Bangladesh are particularly vulnerable, since the barbed wire camps
had their unique violent everyday narratives while the host
communities from outside perceived the camps as breeding grounds for
militancy.
The
misleading and prejudicial information fed by the hostile state and
non-state actors and the media in both Burma and Bangladesh created
an image of Rohingya militancy as a massive security threat which in
reality is simply not accurate.
The
massive presence of the security sector in the North Arakan state has
seen an increase in sexual and gender-based violence. In particular,
the Nay-Sat Kut-kwey Ye (NaSaKa), established in 1992, has
systematically targeted the Rohingyas.
NaSaKa
members and soldiers have targeted Rohingya girls and women and many
of their attacks have been racially motivated. Various human rights
reports also noted how race was one of the major instigators of
sexual violence against Rohingya women and children.
The
strict licensing system to restrict movements, deportation and forced
labour, land grabbing and torture have made the living conditions
harsh for Rohingyas in their own homeland. Racial hatred had
been a huge factor in the human rights abuses perpetrated against
Rohingyas.
During
personal interviews taken over the span of the last few years,
Rohingya refugees have talked about the use of derogatory and
humiliating words by the security forces. The more refined
officials use newly accepted terms concealed beneath other
politically correct categories accentuating difference such as
culture, ethnicity and religion.
A
recent report states that in 2009, in an open letter to other
diplomats Burma’s consul general in Hong Kong, who is now a UN
ambassador, described the Rohingya as ‘ugly as ogres’ and
compared their ‘dark brown skin to that of the fair and soft ethnic
Burmese majority’.
What
is really demoralising for human rights activism is that members of
ethnic communities, who have been oppressed for decades by the
military regimes, also despise the Rohingya.
Ko
Ko Gyi, a prominent former political prisoner who was released in
January, has said that the Rohingya should not be mistreated but
stressed that they were not an ethnic group of Burma.
There
are numerous political/human rights/women’s groups and activists
who firmly believe that Rohingyas do not belong to their Burma.
Burmese women’s networks, for example, which are champions of
human rights and gender sensitive strategies often deliberately
exclude Rohingya women’s rights activists following obstructions
made by particular Arakanese women’s rights groups.
When
I questioned activists on the Thai-Burma border why Rohingya
activists were not included in their programs, one of the most common
responses that I heard was that the Arakanese and Rohingya leadership
needed to resolve internal issues first. The lack of political will
for a variety of reasons and also to some extent the capacity of
other ethnic groups to intervene had also compounded the problem.
All
these events took place just when Aung San Suu Kyi was about to leave
the country for her European tour on 13 June. Some criticised
her for leaving Burma during such a sensitive period. Suu Kyi,
during her trip in Thailand and in Europe, has stressed that the rule
of law is necessary to bring stability in Burma.
Responding
to a question on the citizenship issue of Rohingyas at the Oslo
Forum, Suu Kyi pointed out: “We are not certain exactly what the
requirements of citizenship law are…, If we were very clear as to
who are the citizens of the country under the citizenship law and who
qualify, then there wouldn’t be this problem… We have to have
rule of law, and we have to know what the law is. We have to make
sure that it is properly implemented”.
The
citizenship question remains at the core of Rohingyas’ persecution,
statelessness and insecurity. Sadly, the winds of change in
Burma do not automatically signal a change in the question of
legality and illegality for Rohingyas. Their lack of bargaining
power and the deep resentment and racist attitude of various key
stakeholders towards Rohingyas indicate that this is not going to be
resolved on a priority basis in the near future by Burma’s leaders
either.
The
Burma-Bangladesh border and its discontents
While
six boats carrying the distraught and traumatised refugees from
Sittwe were stranded on the Naf River, Bangladesh’s Foreign
Minister Dipu Moni stated in a parliamentary session that this was an
internal issue of Burma, which was not persecuting the Rohingya and
that Bangladesh had no obligation to provide humanitarian assistance
because it was not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its
1967 Protocol. She further stated that Bangladesh had to
protect its national security.
Similar
internal displacement was caused after communal violence erupted in
Burma in 1942 that also spilled over into the whole of Arakan. The
Buddhist Arakanese and the Muslim Rohingya were engaged in a bitter
battle after which the Arakanese moved to the south and the Rohingyas
to the north – including 22,000 who crossed the border to Bengal.
The second wave of migration occurred following a nationwide
census project, Nagamin, during which more than 200,000 fled across
the border in Bangladesh.
From
1991 to 1992, more than 270,000 Rohingya refugees crossed the border
from Burma. With them they brought their experiences of
horrific violence, forced labour, rape, executions and torture.
Bangladesh
initially welcomed the persecuted refugees. The country’s
leadership viewed the issue as a short-term problem and wanted to
resolve it through bilateral negotiations with Burma. The Bangladeshi
government saw it as a moral boost to be offering assistance for once
and not seeking it. Initially, the country welcomed the UNHCR,
the Red Cross and various other international agencies to assist the
refugees.
But
soon, the strain on localities where the camps were constructed
started to worry the ruling regimes. Over the last two decades,
public support in Bangladesh has significantly decreased and
subsequent governments have been less sympathetic to the refugees.
The
recent anti-Rohingya xenophobic attitude displayed by Bangladeshis is
primarily coming from the ultra-nationalistic front, which claims
that the Rohingyas are being supported and armed by Jamaa’t-i-Islami,
the party that questioned and violently opposed the liberation war of
Bangladesh in 1971. Those who hold this view believe that the
Rohingyas would also be used as a vote bank for the next election.
Burmese propaganda also implied that the fleeing people were mostly
Islamic insurgents added to the anxiety of the Bangladesh government.
This
accusation took the consideration away from the inhumane condition of
the Rohingya living into various camps, by making them a national
security concern. The UNHCR viewed repatriation as the most
logical response and in many instances resorted to involuntary
repatriation of the Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh.
“The
Burmese and the Bangladeshi government have strategically employed
misperceptions, fears and prejudice to portray all Rohingyas as
terrorists”
Currently,
there are 26,311 Rohingya recognised refugees living in various camps
in border areas. Although the UNHCR is providing support to
21,716 of the Rohingya refugees living in camps, the Bangladeshi
government has repeatedly denied UNHCR requests to set up
self-reliance activities both inside and outside the camps. According
to the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC), there are
about 200,000 undocumented refugees.
Further,
the increase in numbers of undocumented Rohingyas settled in
Chittagong, particularly in the hills, have angered local
communities.
Meghna
Guhathakurta, a researcher studying the Rohingyas, noted in a
personal conversation: “Rohingyas have come in (Bangladesh) anyway
over the years and have (now) settled in Bandarban only because they
have been chased away from the [plains]. The construction boom in
Cox’s Bazar is one of the main attractions, so they would naturally
want to settle in the [plains], but [after] meeting hostility in the
host community they therefore are driven to the woods and hills.”
The
Chittagong Hill Tracts, which is home to indigenous Bangladeshis, has
yet to recover from its own experience of a protracted conflict that
formally ended with signing of an accord in 1997. Continual human
rights abuses, major displacements of indigenous communities and land
grabbing by illegal Bengali settlers from the plains have produced
multi-layered insecurities for its indigenous population.
Rohingya
migration to the CHT adds to these insecurities as reports spread
concerning the Rohingya’s involvement in illegal logging, drug
trafficking and various unlawful activities. However, it is
actually the security sector and the Bengali settlers who run these
activities and take advantage of Rohingya labour in the CHT.
With
regard to the legality argument, Bangladesh needs to adhere to
international norms and laws. The Partition of India displaced
millions from West Bengal and Bihar who took refuge in East Pakistan,
which later became Bangladesh. An estimated 10 million people
were forcibly displaced to India during its independence in 1971. A
large number returned when it became independent. Since
breaking away from Pakistan, it was the home of 300,000 Biharis who
became stateless and were interned in 66 camps within the country, at
least until 2007.
It
has a large indigenous population, which were displaced during
development projects and/or during the conflict in the CHT. Also,
every year, thousands of people are internally displaced in
Bangladesh due to floods and waterlogging. Thus, one could
argue that its population has a variety of experiences of
displacement and the nation-state had been built by refugees and a
history of wars.
Yet,
it doesn’t have any legal regime that could protect people who are
refugees, internally displaced or stateless. As mentioned above,
Bangladesh is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol. However, it is party to a number of international
human rights instruments, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
International Conventions.
Bangladesh
is bound to offer protection to the refugees by Article 5 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 22 of the Convention
of the Rights of the Child; Articles 2, 3 (this is paralleled to
non-refoulement of the 1951 Convention) and 6 of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment; Article 44 and 45 of the fourth Geneva Conventions. Most
importantly, Bangladesh’s Constitution in its Preamble pledges to
protect fundamental human rights of all.
Both
the Burmese and the Bangladeshi government have strategically
employed misperceptions, fears and prejudice to portray all Rohingyas
as terrorists. Neither the states nor in many cases, the human
rights and political activists from these states, separate armed
groups activities from the plight of the civilian Rohingyas.
Following
the forced migration in 1991 and 1992, both the states and, to some
extent the UNHCR, provided inadequate information and suggested that
it would make more sense to send the refugees back ‘home’.
Bangladesh
ignored their stateless status in Burma and the UNHCR stated that
refugees wouldn’t be any worse in Burma. As repeated events
of desperate attempts by Rohingya refugees demonstrate, power
inequalities, repatriation politics and the discourse of national
security not only made the Rohingya community more vulnerable but
also denied them the ‘right to have rights’.
-
Dr Bina D’Costa, Fellow, Politics and International Affairs, School
of Culture, History and Language, the Australian National University.
She is currently working on a manuscript focusing on the edifice of
political violence in refugee communities in South Asia.
Source DVB
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